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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/045,117	11/01/2001	Dale E. Gulick	2000.051400	2421
23720	7590	10/26/2004	EXAMINER	
WILLIAMS, MORGAN & AMERSON, P.C. 10333 RICHMOND, SUITE 1100 HOUSTON, TX 77042			KNOLL, CLIFFORD H	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			2112	
DATE MAILED: 10/26/2004				

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

10/045,117

Applicant(s)

GULICK, DALE E.

Examiner

Clifford H Knoll

Art Unit

2112

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 13 August 2004.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-29 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-23, 25-27 and 29 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☒ Claim(s) 24, 28 is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892) | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____ |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152) |
| 3) <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____ | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ |

DETAILED ACTION

This Office Action is responsive to communication filed 8/13/2004. Currently claims 1-29 are pending.

The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.

Request for Information

1. *Applicant and the assignee of this application are required under 37 CFR 1.105 to provide the following information that the examiner has determined is reasonably necessary to the examination of this application.*

Examiner requests information that establishes the meaning and the enablement of the Alert Standard Format (ASF) standard as it was known by the Applicant at the time the invention was made. Applicant has referred to the ASF standard as prior art in the specification (p. 4, lines 10-22) and in Figure 1C; furthermore, in claims 1, 13, 16, 22, and 26, Applicant refers to the same.

Applicant has previously submitted the document "Alert Standard Format (ASF) Specification, version 1.03, dated 6/20/2001; however, evidence submitted in the Gulick declaration of 8/13/2004 indicates knowledge and use of Alert Standard Format on or before 1/28/2000. Therefore the art relied upon as prior art and consequently relied upon to draft the claimed subject matter is not available to the Examiner.

With an eye toward establishing enablement, Examiner requests information on the Alert Standard Format as it was known to the Applicant, such information provided should be sufficient to enable the use of Alert Standard Format on the date the invention was conceived, supported by the aforementioned evidence dated 1/28/2000.

2. *The fee and certification requirements of 37 CFR 1.97 are waived for those documents submitted in reply to this requirement. This waiver extends only to those documents within the scope of this requirement under 37 CFR 1.105 that are included in the applicant's first complete communication responding to this requirement. Any supplemental replies subsequent to the first communication responding to this requirement and any information disclosures beyond the scope of this requirement under 37 CFR 1.105 are subject to the fee and certification requirements of 37 CFR 1.97.*
3. *This requirement is an attachment of the enclosed Office action. A complete reply to the enclosed Office action must include a complete reply to this requirement. The time period for reply to this requirement coincides with the time period for reply to the enclosed Office action.*

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102

4. *Claims 1-8, 10, 12-17, and 19-21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) as being anticipated by Lindsay (US 2003/0028633).*

Regarding claims 1 and 13, ASF discloses the interface logic and first external bus (e.g., paragraph [0102], "via the SMBus"), an Alert Standard Format management engine configured to receive Alert Standard Format sensor data over the first external bus (e.g., paragraph [0102], "ASF sensors"); and an indicator configured to indicate a master mode or a slave mode (e.g., paragraph [0102], "push alerts to the ASD device"), wherein in the master mode, the embedded Alert Standard Format management engine is further configured to actively poll for the Alert Standard Format sensor data over the first external bus (e.g., paragraph [0102], "via polling legacy sensors").

Regarding claims 2 and 3, Lindsay also discloses a second bus interface logic for coupling to a first internal bus, wherein data from the first external bus is routable by the embedded Alert Standard Format management engine over the first internal bus with an embedded Ethernet controller coupled to the first internal bus (e.g., paragraph [0102], "NIC firmware").

Regarding claim 4, Lindsay also discloses the embedded Ethernet controller is configured to route the Alert Standard Format sensor data from the embedded Alert Standard Format management engine to an external management server (e.g., paragraph [0102], "SNMP").

Regarding claim 5, Lindsay also discloses the indicator is stored in an enable register in the integrated circuit (e.g., paragraph [0104], "ASF_ALERT").

Regarding claim 6, Lindsay also discloses a power port configured to receive a reserve power signal, wherein the reserve power signal provides reserve power to the enable register (e.g., paragraph [0049]).

Regarding claim 7, Lindsay also discloses the integrated circuit comprises a bridge, wherein the bridge further includes: a third bus interface logic for coupling to a second external bus (e.g., paragraph [0051], "PCI").

Regarding claim 8, Lindsay also discloses the bridge comprises a south bridge (e.g., paragraph [0051], "GPIO").

Regarding claim 10, Lindsay also discloses a micro controller (e.g., paragraph [0099]).

Regarding claim 12, Lindsay also discloses the embedded Alert Standard Format management engine in slave mode is configured to respond to an external Alert Standard Format master (e.g., paragraph [0102], "push alerts to the ASD device").

Regarding claim 14, Lindsay also discloses for routing the Alert Standard Format sensor data from the means for receiving Alert Standard Format sensor data to an external management server (e.g., paragraph [0102], "SNMP").

Regarding claim 15, Lindsay also discloses the means for receiving Alert Standard Format sensor data is configured to respond to an external Alert Standard Format master while in the slave mode (e.g., paragraph [0102], "push alerts to the ASD device").

Regarding claim 16, Lindsay discloses a first bus; a location for coupling to the first bus configured to receive an Alert Standard Format network interface card; and an integrated circuit, comprising a first bus interface logic for coupling to the first bus (e.g., paragraph [0102], "via the SMBus"), an Alert Standard Format management engine for receiving ASF sensor data configured to receive ASF sensor data over the first bus

Art Unit: 2112

(e.g., paragraph [0102], "ASF sensors"); and an indicator configured to indicate a master mode or a slave mode for the Alert Standard Format management engine, wherein in the master mode, the Alert Standard Format management engine is further configured to actively poll for the ASF sensor data over the first bus (e.g., paragraph [0102], "via polling legacy sensors"), while, the Alert Standard Format management engine is not further configured to actively poll for the ASF sensor data over the first bus in the slave mode (e.g., paragraph [0102], "push alerts to the ASD device").

Regarding claim 17, Lindsay also discloses a micro controller (e.g., paragraph [0099]).

Regarding claim 19, Lindsay also discloses the integrated circuit comprises a bridge, wherein the bridge further includes: a third bus interface logic for coupling to a second external bus (e.g., paragraph [0051], "PCI").

Regarding claim 20, Lindsay also discloses the bridge comprises a south bridge (e.g., paragraph [0051], "GPIO").

Regarding claim 21, Lindsay also discloses the Alert Standard Format network interface card installed at the location (e.g., paragraph [0074]); and wherein the indicator of the integrated circuit indicates the slave mode in response to the presence of the Alert Standard Format network interface card (e.g., paragraph [0104], "information about each legacy sensor").

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103

5. *Claims 8-9 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lindsay in view of industry standard computer architectural features, as evidenced by Hobson (US 6360327).*

Regarding claims 8 and 20, Lindsay also discloses an exemplary computer system but neglects the express detail of a south bridge; however the Examiner takes Official Notice that a south bridge is an industry standard feature in computer systems as evidenced by Hobson; who expressly discloses the common north bridge/ south bridge terminology in a standard computer system (e.g., Figure 1). It would be obvious to combine Lindsay with industry standard computer architecture because of the wide application conferred upon Lindsay's invention by the use of industry standard computer technology. Therefore it would have been obvious to combine an industry standard architecture with Lindsay to obtain the claimed invention.

Regarding claim 9, Lindsay also discloses wherein the first input/output bus is an SMBus (e.g., paragraph [0087]).

6. *Claims 11 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lindsay in view of industry standard microcontroller usage, as evidenced by Schwarz (US 4910732).*

Regarding claims 11 and 18, Lindsay also discloses a microcontroller, but does not expressly mention the particular embodiment of an 8051 controller; however the

Art Unit: 2112

Examiner takes Official Notice that it is manifestly obvious to use an industry standard controller such as an 8051 controller to implement a microcontroller as evidenced by Schwarz (e.g., col. 1, lines 36-39). It would have been obvious to use an 8051 controller to implement Lindsay's microcontroller because 8051 is a well-known universal microcontroller for implementing a broad variety of control functions, such as network controller operations. Therefore it would have been obvious to combine a widely used controller with the invention of Lindsay to obtain the claimed invention.

7. *Claims 22-23 and 26-27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lindsay with inherent features evidenced by Lindsay (US 2002/0194415, herein "Lindsay-2), in view of industry standard architectural practices as evidenced by Cromer (US 6282642).*

Regarding claims 22 and 26, Lindsay discloses detecting an Alert Standard Format network interface card presence in the client computer system (e.g., paragraph [0070, "driver that manipulates the SMBus interface"). Lindsay does not expressly mention the master and slave modes responsive to the priority assertion of Lindsay's ASF network interface card; however this is an inherent feature of the SMBus, as evidenced by further description provided in Lindsay-2 in paragraph [0090] which details relevant aspects of the SMBus specification; in particular, "one device will master the bus at a giving time", and "a host is a specialized master that provides the main interface to the system's CPU".

Lindsay does not mention the master and slave modes as expressly occurring in a south bridge; however Examiner takes Official Notice that the south bridge is a device

Art Unit: 2112

known in the industry standard and commonly used to interface disparate buses employed in the standard architecture, such as the SMBus of Lindsay. This finds evidence in Cromer who describes a computer architecture as including a south bridge (e.g., col. 4, lines 60-67, "core chipset 66"), which controls the SMBus (e.g., col. 8, lines 19-24). It would have been obvious to combine Lindsay with industry standard practice because, Lindsay would achieve greatest benefit and widest application in systems designed using industry standard practices. Therefore it would have been obvious to combine Lindsay with industry standard practices to obtain the claimed invention.

Regarding claims 23 and 27, Lindsay also discloses assertion of priority according to the SMBus specification and thus inherently providing an indication of either the master or slave mode (e.g., paragraph [0102], "polling").

8. *Claims 25 and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lindsay as applied above in claims 22 and 26, respectively, in view of Cromer.*

Lindsay does not expressly mention the south bridge responding to power management requests from the network interface card; however this feature is disclosed by Cromer. Cromer discloses south bridge responding to power management requests (e.g., col. 8, lines 24-32). It would have been obvious to combine Lindsay with Cromer, because Cromer teaches the response to requests in a power management system which is a precursor to the Alert Standard Format, as evidenced by the Alert Standard Specification, submitted by Applicant as prior art. Cromer further teaches the advantages of providing power management information held by a south bridge to the network information card to allow greater control of the power management functions of

Art Unit: 2112

the client system over the network. Therefore it would have been obvious to combine Cromer with Lindsay to obtain the claimed invention.

Allowable Subject Matter

9. *Claims 24 and 28 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. In particular, recitation in these claims renders respective parent claims definite, and thus, if incorporated into the parent claim would overcome the parent claim rejection under 35 USC 112.*

The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter:

These claims further limit the particular function of the master mode of the south bridge as performing polling of ASF sensors and do not appear in Lindsay, nor can it be found obvious in view of other prior art.

Loison (US 6477602) discloses detecting the presence of a network interface card, which, if present, causes other system management devices to be disabled; however, in Loison the other devices are themselves network devices which owing to their protocol can be disabled, but invention is applied only in a low power mode.

Cromer (US 6415324) discloses local management that overrides network management, which is the opposite of Applicant's claimed invention.

Art Unit: 2112

Any comments considered necessary by applicant must be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee and, to avoid processing delays, should preferably accompany the issue fee. Such submissions should be clearly labeled "Comments on Statement of Reasons for Allowance."

Response to Arguments

10. *The declarations filed 8/13/2004 under 37 CFR 1.131 have been considered but are determined to be insufficient to establish priority of invention over Lindsay, as detailed below.*
11. *Applicant's communication has met the formal requirements for submission of a declaration (MPEP 715.04).*
12. *The evidence submitted is insufficient to establish conception of the claimed invention prior to the effective date (4/21/2001) of the Lindsay reference.*

While conception is the mental part of the inventive act, it must be capable of proof, such as by demonstrative evidence or by a complete disclosure to another. Conception is more than a vague idea of how to solve a problem. The requisite means themselves and their interaction must also be comprehended. See *Mergenthaler v. Scudder*, 1897 C.D. 724, 81 O.G. 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1897).

The MPEP states (as per 715.07):

The essential thing to be shown under 37 CFR 1.131 is priority of invention and this may be done by any satisfactory evidence of the fact. FACTS, not conclusions, must be alleged.

Evidence in the form of exhibits may accompany the affidavit or declaration. Each exhibit relied upon should be specifically referred to in the affidavit or declaration, in terms of what it is relied upon to show....

The affidavit or declaration and exhibits must clearly explain which facts or data applicant is relying on to show completion of his or her invention prior to the particular date. Vague and general statements in broad terms about what the exhibits describe along with a general assertion that the exhibits describe a reduction to practice "amounts essentially to mere pleading, unsupported by proof or a showing of facts" and, thus, does not satisfy the requirements of 37 CFR 1.131(b). In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 184 USPQ 29 (CCPA 1974). Applicant must give a clear explanation of the exhibits pointing out exactly what facts are established and relied on by applicant. 505 F.2d at 718-19, 184 USPQ at 33. See also In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 142 USPQ 164 (CCPA 1964) (Affidavit "asserts that facts exist but does not tell what they are or when they occurred.")

Gulick's declaration fails to establish the conception because it fails to "clearly explain which facts or data applicant is relying on to show completion of his or her invention prior to the particular date". The declaration merely attests to the date of an "invention disclosure" (provided as Exhibit A). Therefore the declaration does not even allege conception of the claimed invention and lacks clear and positive statements that explain the facts in the exhibit that support conception of the claimed features.

Even if the exhibit (dated 1/28/2000) is considered on its own merits, it does not provide sufficient evidence, alone or in combination with the declaration, to support all the claimed limitations, therefore it fails to establish conception of the claimed invention prior to the reference date of Lindsay (4/21/2001). For example, there is no showing in the exhibit or positive statement in the declaration to support the limitation of an

Art Unit: 2112

"indicator configured to indicate" (claims 1 and 16) or "means for indicating" (claim 13) "a master mode or a slave mode for the embedded Alert Standard Format management engine, wherein in the master mode, the embedded Alert Standard Format engine is further configured to actively poll for the Alert Standard Format sensor data over the first external bus" or "operating the Alert Standard Format south bridge in a master mode" (claims 22 and 26). The Exhibit presents terminology such as "master control loop", "polling task" and "ASF slave mode support" in mere outline form without linkage or explanation, and which, considered as a whole, fail to establish conception.

As per MPEP 2138.04:

Conception has been defined as "the complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act" and it is "the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in practice." Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295, 4 USPQ 269, 271 (CCPA 1930). "[C]onception is established when the invention is made sufficiently clear to enable one skilled in the art to reduce it to practice without the exercise of extensive experimentation or the exercise of inventive skill." Hiatt v. Ziegler, 179 USPQ 757, 763 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1973). Conception has also been defined as a disclosure of an invention which enables one skilled in the art to reduce the invention to a practical form without "exercise of the inventive faculty." Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 197 USPQ 482 (CCPA 1978). See also Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 224 USPQ 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

The Applicant has failed to meet the burden to establish that conception of the claimed invention occurs prior to the priority date of Lindsay (4/24/2001).

13. *The evidence submitted is insufficient to establish diligence from a date prior to the date of reduction to practice of the Lindsay reference (4/24/2001) to the filing date of the application (11/1/01).*

From MPEP 715.07(a):

In determining the sufficiency of a 37 CFR 1.131 affidavit or declaration, diligence need not be considered unless conception of the invention prior to the effective date is clearly established, since diligence comes into question only after prior conception is established. Ex parte Kantor, 177 USPQ 455 (Bd. App. 1958).

However, in the interest of compact prosecution, the Examiner notes that the evidence submitted is insufficient to establish diligence from a date prior to the effective date of the Lindsay reference (4/24/2001).

Also from MPEP 715.07(a):

Where conception occurs prior to the date of the reference, but reduction to practice is afterward, it is not enough merely to allege that applicant or patent owner had been diligent. Ex parte Hunter, 1889 C.D. 218, 49 O.G. 733 (Comm'r Pat. 1889). Rather, applicant must show evidence of facts establishing diligence).

Beginning with the priority date of Lindsay, 4/24/2001, the declarations as a whole fail to present affirmative steps that establish due diligence between 4/24/2001 and the constructive reduction to practice, which coincides with the filing of the application (11/1/2001).

Gulick declaration:

Gulick states an invention disclosure was prepared 1/28/2000 and subsequently sent to the attorney 5/12/2000 (§§ 3-4). Gulick subsequently states that he received an initial draft of the application 7/27/2001 (§§ 6). Presumably applicant is relying on attorney's diligence to account for the period of 4/24/2001–7/27/2001.

Upon receipt of the initial draft of the application, Gulick avers that he “diligently reviewed the application” and executed formal papers for the application 10/31/2001 (§§ 6-7). Applicant merely alleges diligence for the 3 month period of 7/27/2001-10/31/2001 with no showing of facts or supporting documentation.

Gulick further states that 16 related patent applications were received in draft form 3/9/2000—5/2/2001 (§§ 5). The alleged diligence does not impinge upon consideration of the issue of diligence in the instant application. Furthermore, the attested dates lie partially or completely outside the dates for which diligence must be demonstrated.

Sincell declaration:

The Sincell declaration appears to be designed at least to account for the period of 4/24/2001—7/27/2001. However, the critical period that requires a showing of diligence covers the entire period 4/24/2001—10/31/2001.

Sincell attests to receipt of an invention disclosure 5/15/2000 and the mailing of a draft application to the Applicant 7/27/2001 (§§ 3-4). However, no statement or showing of diligence is provided for the period 4/24/2001-7/27/2001.

Sincell subsequently states "to the extent necessary, the application was revised" (¶ 5) and formal papers were signed by the inventor 10/31/2001 (¶ 6). No statement nor showing of diligence is provided for the period 7/27/2001—10/31/2001.

Sincell attests to review of 16 related applications (3/9/2000—5/2/2001) and filing of 18 related applications (4/7/2000—5/30/2001). These statements attest to activity of the attorney over the period 3/9/2000—5/30/2001 and as stated are submitted "as further evidence of the diligence of the inventors and attorneys" (¶ 8-10). This impinges on the showing of diligence for an earlier period 4/24/2001-5/30/2001, but fails to provide any evidence of diligence for the later period 5/30/2001—10/31/2001.

For the period 4/24/2001—5/30/2001, while the review of and filing of 18 applications affirms a certain workload for the attorney, though over an expansive period (3/9/2000—5/30/2001) far exceeding the period in question; the Examiner finds the declaration fails to establish sufficient linkage between the facts of this workload submitted in exhibit and the preparation of the instant application so as to establish diligence in the instant application.

The period 5/30/2001-10/31/2001 is totally unaccounted for by the declaration.

Examiner concludes that no showing of diligence is provided for the entire critical period from the priority date of the Lindsay reference (4/24/2001) and the signing of formal papers for the present application on 10/31/2001.

14. *Applicant has failed to provide a showing of evidence to establish the attested date of conception (1/28/2000) and has also failed to provide a showing of evidence to establish a period of uninterrupted diligence from the priority date of Lindsay*

(4/24/2001) to Applicant's constructive reduction to practice (11/1/2001). Therefore, Applicant's arguments filed 8/13/2004 regarding priority over Lindsay, used in the rejections under 102 and 103, have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

Conclusion

15. ***THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.*** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).


A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.

16. *This Office action has an attached requirement for information under 37 CFR 1.105. A complete reply to this Office action must include a complete reply to the attached requirement for information. The time period for reply to the attached requirement coincides with the time period for reply to this Office action.*

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Clifford H Knoll whose telephone number is 571-272-3636. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F 0630-1500.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Mark H Rinehart can be reached on 571-272-3632. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 703-872-9306.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).



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